<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carvalho, E.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Nature of Hinge Commitments</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sképsis</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.academia.edu/37418056/On_the_Nature_of_Hinge_Commitments</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">X</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-66</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments. &lt;/p&gt;
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></issue></record></records></xml>