<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carvalho, Eros</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kuhn e a racionalidade da escolha científica</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Principia</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.academia.edu/4265687/Kuhn_e_a_racionalidade_da_escolha_cientifica</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">439-458</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientiﬁc revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufﬁciently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether&lt;/p&gt;
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record></records></xml>